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ABSTRACT

Michel Foucault uses the term biopolitics to highlight the focus on life that is at
the center of contemporary politics. Biopower or biopolitics is the maximization of life
through various regulatory apparatuses that monitor, modify, and control life processes. I
elucidate and exemplify Foucault’s framework in order to show how the medical
discourse exercises a certain kind of power over bodies in the name of health. My
argument is that through the mechanisms of biopower, the juridico-medical discourse
simultaneously makes pregnancy into an object of study and the pregnant woman into a
subject of power. With the help of a Foucauldian interpretation, I attempt to unmask the
not-so-visible techniques of biopolitics that surround the pregnant woman. The
unmasking makes it possible to think differently which is the primary task of philosophy.
Specifically, such a critique helps in reformulating the problem as one of subjectivation.
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INTRODUCTION

For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living
animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern
man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living
being into question.
(Foucault, History of Sexuality)
What is philosophy if not a way of reflecting, not so much on what
is true and what is false, as on our relationship to truth?
(Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth)

Philosophy has always been concerned with the issues of life and death as well as with
the concept of rights and justice. Over the last two millennia, philosophers have written
about the relationship between politics and life. For Aristotle, the polis exists for the sake
of life: “the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.”1 But Michel Foucault turns this
around and shows that we are now in a regime where man’s very existence as a living
being is called into question by his politics. Foucault theorizes about this conjunction of
life and politics through the conceptual lens that he calls ‘biopolitics.’ In a biopolitical
regime, according to Foucault, power is exercised over life in contrast to the historical
sovereign power that was over death. Power, in the Foucauldian framework, is neither
centralized nor is it an object that can be possessed by an individual. Instead, we find
diffused and immanent networks of power where the individual is shown to be nothing
but the subject of these network relations. In other words, the sovereign individual of the
humanistic discourse disappears; instead it comes to be realized as the subject. And
1

Aristotle, Politics. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Book One Part II.
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therefore in place of the sovereign model of power as a repressive force we have
technologies of biopower2 exerted in order to maximize life in the biopolitical
framework.
This reconceptualization of the individual as a subject of power problematizes the
liberal rhetoric of choice and rights which assumes the existence of autonomous
individuals. Using a different understanding of power and its operations in the
constitution of the subject, the Foucauldian framework of biopower provides us with the
theoretical tool necessary to analyze social phenomena – concerning health, reproduction,
euthanasia, and related issues – differently from their usual formulation, where the rights
of an individual are posited against the State or rights of one group are seen as vying with
those of another.
This is exemplified in a recent incident concerning a woman from Utah named
Melissa Ann Rowland. In 2004, she was charged with homicide because she failed to
heed the doctor’s advice to have a caesarean section and gave birth to a stillborn fetus.
This incident generated a lot of debate at both the national and international levels.
“Some rights are deadly,” ran a newspaper headline discussing her case.3 The
controversial issue was framed in terms of rights: those of the mother on the one hand,
and the rights of the fetus on the other hand. Does the mother have a right to choose with

2

We should note that Foucault used the terms biopower and biopolitics interchangeably, as do several
commentators on the subject; thus I follow the same practice. Farrell (2005) writes: “Foucault describes the
technologies used to manage populations as ‘biopolitics’ or ‘biopower’ ” (105, emphasis added), thus not
distinguishing between the two terms, as does Parry (2005). To mention another example, Ojakangas
(2005) writes it as “bio-political power or biopower” (p. 5).
3

Some rights are deadly, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), March 19, 2004.

2

respect to matters that concern her own body over the rights of the fetus, or does the
rights of the unborn – the fetal ‘right to life’ – come first?
Similar lines of argument are seen in the context of abortion as well. And the
issue of ‘right to life’ has emerged albeit in various guises quite often in contemporary
discourses on euthanasia and death penalty, among others. At a broader level, vital issues
such as life, death and health have increasingly become the focus of attention in politics.
Therefore I assert that a Foucauldian biopolitical analysis can be an important
philosophical undertaking. In making visible the generally invisible networks of power,
and showing in particular how medical and juridical discourses produce certain subjects
of power and objects of study, my thesis uncovers the processes that criminalize a woman
who refuses certain forms of medical intervention on her own body. Further, by showing
how life is increasingly legislated, a biopolitical analysis can help us to think differently
about these issues that can lead to the unmasking of the workings of power and thereby to
loosen its hold on the subject.
While traditional philosophy has been engaged in seeking foundational truths,
Foucault’s project is to examine how certain utterances come to be viewed as true
discourses, and to identify the conditions of possibility that delineates something as an
object of knowledge. Foucault’s work brings into focus the conditions of formation of a
discourse that produces certain subjects of social attention, such as a criminal and a
madman, and thus by looking into the conditions of “truth,” engages us in philosophical
activity. The significance of a biopolitical analysis arises from such activity.
Let me now briefly consider the philosophical lineage of Foucault and the nature
and methodology of Foucault’s work. Foucault has been viewed both as a philosopher
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and as a historiographer, though not in the traditional sense in either case. Foucault
probably comes closest to being a philosopher in the usual sense of the term in his work
titled The Order of Things; but even here, as elsewhere, he attempts to critique the notion
of disciplinary knowledge, trying to carry out his archaeological analysis at the level of
the subconscious of knowledge, or what he calls the epistemological field. However,
epistemology per se is not Foucault’s concern. Rather than seeking transcendental truth,
Foucault asserts that truth is a historical category. Knowledge, as Foucault shows, comes
out of and is bounded by political and historical factors, that is, by the workings of
power. While Foucault was viewed as a structuralist in the early phase of his writing, he
moved away from the structuralist framework to undertake an investigation of knowledge
that led him to the problematics of power.
In terms of being a historiographer, Foucault’s genealogical analysis of systems of
thought is very close to Nietzsche’s work. Just as Nietzsche (1989) traces the emergence
of ascetic ideals not in some lofty principles but in the mundane petty feelings of
ressentiment, revenge, and guilt, Foucault traces regimes of truth to regimes of power and
not to some universal domain of absolute knowledge. Nietzsche the genealogist identifies
his project as a revaluation of moral values, and according to him
the value of these values themselves must first be called in question – and for that
there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew,
under which they evolved and changed [based on] what is documented, what can
actually be confirmed and has actually existed, in short, the entire long hieroglyphic
record (1989: 20-21, emphasis in the original).
Foucault’s approach is very similar as he undertakes a study of the “knowledge of
the conditions and circumstances” – not of morals – but of that in which knowledge itself
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emerges, by sifting through the archives or accumulated discourses, akin to Nietzsche’s
hieroglyphic record. In fact, Foucault (1984) shows his debt to Nietzsche in his article
titled “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” implicitly bringing to bear Nietzsche’s work on
his own. Foucault takes up some Nietzschean terms such as Herkunft, Entstehung and
Ursprung and shows that in the Nietzschean discussion of morality there is no originary
moment or essence to be found. Instead, there are only the conflict of forces and the
consequences minor accidents. Foucault emphasizes the opposition of the genealogical
method to history: neither is there a teleological movement nor is there any profound
intention behind events. Genealogy denies the “suprahistorical perspective” (NGH: 88)
that a traditional historian assumes. Moreover, genealogy also denies the historical or
phenomenological subject and instead “account[s] for the constitution of the subject
within a historical framework” (P/K: 117).
Foucault formulates his own work as a “genealogy of problems” that tries to
answer “why a certain way of problematizing appears at a given point in time” (FL: 414).
The conflict of forces that is found in Nietzsche – where the struggle is not between
individuals but, as Entstehung, is “the struggle these forces wage against each other”
(NGH: 83) – is reflected in Foucault’s analytics of power. In Foucault, there is no subject
wielding power; instead power is seen as “modes of action … [that] structure the possible
field of action of others” (SP: 221). Thus Foucault’s genealogy simultaneously critiques
philosophy’s search for transcendental truth and the traditional political conception of
power as a commodity (Shiner: 1982).
Paul Rabinow (1984) comments that Foucault’s original contribution lies in his
taking Nietzschean genealogy and pursuing “the consequences of these [genealogical]
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questions with unparalleled systematicity and vigor” (12). Rabinow also finds a
Heideggerian strain in Foucault. For Rabinow, “Foucault seems to be identifying with the
critique of theory initiated in modern times by Nietzsche and pursued by Heidegger”
(13). For Foucault, critique is “the movement by which the subject assumes the right to
question truth on its effects of power, and power on its effects on truth” (Foucault cited in
Gordon 2000: xxxix). Knowledge and power cannot be separated according to Foucault;
and it is this connection that he serves to highlight throughout his wide-ranging work
including that on prisons and sexuality.
In the first chapter, I will explain Foucault’s conception of power-knowledge
through a discussion of some important terms in Foucault such as discourse, truth and
power. I will connect it to Foucault’s work on the history of sexuality and elaborate on
the Foucauldian framework of biopolitics. To understand these concepts, it is necessary
to understand power in the way that Foucault theorizes. Power is not a possession but a
relation, not concentrated but diffused, not transcendent but immanent. Thus, according
to Foucault, we cannot study power in terms of the juridical model but in terms of
technologies and strategies that power deploys. Most importantly, power is not simply
prohibitive but productive, producing true discourses. Foucault identifies two
technologies of power. The first is the disciplinary technology operating often through
institutions at the level of individual bodies while the second is the regulatory technology,
which operates at the level of populations and works on life itself. The former is
disciplinary power while the latter is biopower.
In the following chapter, I will review some literature that employs the
biopolitical framework and the closely related studies of governmentality to analyze
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social issues. I will discuss four studies that relate specifically to pregnancy. These
studies show in different ways how the fetus and the pregnant woman are made into
objects of knowledge in a highly medicalized discourse of pregnancy.
In the final chapter, using the Foucauldian notion of biopower, I will analyze the
particular case of Melissa Ann Rowland who after delivering a stillborn was charged with
murder for not following the doctor’s advice. I argue that this case exemplifies the
biopolitical strategies that Foucault identified, and show that there is an even greater
deepening and widening of the lines of penetration of power. My argument is that
through the mechanisms of biopower, the juridico-medical discourse simultaneously
makes pregnancy into an object of study and the pregnant woman into a subject of power.

7

CHAPTER 1
BIOPOLITICS: THE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY OF POWER
In order to make a concrete analysis of power relations, we must abandon the
juridical model of sovereignty. That model in effect presupposes that the
individual is a subject with natural rights or primitive powers; … and finally, it
makes the law the basic manifestation of power.
(Foucault, Society Must be Defended)

In the passage from this world to the other, death was the manner in which a
terrestrial sovereignty was relieved by another, singularly more powerful
sovereignty; the pageantry that surrounded it was in the category of political
ceremony. Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes
its dominion; death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes
the most secret aspect of existence, the most “private.”
(Foucault, History of Sexuality)

With the recent extraordinary development of the biological sciences, medical and
genetic technology, along with the increasing complexities of the corresponding legal and
ethical issues, several intellectuals (Negri and Hardt 2004; Rabinow and Rose 2006) have
marked the last few decades as a regime of the biopolitical. As Foucault points out, in the
biopolitical regime politics and life come together in a way that is quite different from the
one Aristotle first envisaged in terms of the relation between the polis and man. In
Foucault’s words,
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the
additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics
calls his existence as a living being into question. (HS: 143)
Foucault conceptualizes the terms biopolitics and biopower to describe the governing of
life itself that replaces the earlier sovereign power over death. Life is now at the heart of
politics that concerns itself with the distinction between life and non-life, including issues
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like euthanasia and abortion, and that also concerns itself with minimizing risk and
maximizing life in terms of hygiene, health, and other regulatory controls over the
population. Thus we find a growing emphasis on the management and monitoring of
populations.
While the concepts biopower or biopolitics relate to a specific form of political
power over life, the terms have also become prominent in the context of a wide variety of
non-Foucauldian discourses, including environmental issues and energy concerns; there
is even a Christian biopolitics. Indeed,
the ‘bios’ of biopolitics is in danger of becoming as expansive a term as Marx's
concept of social reproduction - a black box where everything that had previously
been discarded from economic and political philosophy is conveniently recuperated.
What gets lost in the process is the temporal precision of Foucault's account and its
attention to the minutiae of institutional practice. (Cooper, Goffey and Munster 2005:
n. pag.)
Thus while biopolitics has become a ‘black box’ that has been utilized for various ends,
we need to understand its precise meaning within the Foucauldian framework before we
can use it as a tool of analysis.
As outlined in Foucault’s College de France lectures, his research on biopower
and biopolitics was to be an extensive project, touching upon the relationship of
biological sciences to the state, their role in a regime of liberalism, and the relationship
between life and law, race and war, among others. However, though the projected six
volumes could not be actualized, the discussions that we find on the topic in the first
volume of History of Sexuality as well as in some other lectures and interviews
nevertheless provide us with a robust theoretical apparatus.
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Discourse and the Production of Truths
One key notion in Foucault’s work is the concept of discourse. As Dreyfus and Rabinow
clarify, “discursive practices are distinguished from the speech acts of everyday life.
Foucault is interested only in what we will call serious speech acts: what experts say
when they are speaking as experts” (1982: xxiv, emphasis in the original). Foucault
discusses the rules of formation of discourses in The Order of Things, The Archaeology
of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. While I will try to explain the notion of
discourse in Foucault’s work, we should also note that Foucault himself was equivocal
about the term and admitted to having “used and abused [it] in many different senses: in
the most general, and vaguest way, it denoted a group of verbal performances” (AK:
107).
In The Order of Things, Foucault studies the historical transformations that
affected the fields of natural history, grammar, and the analysis of wealth and how these
were systematized into biology, philology and political economy. Through this study,
Foucault shows that during different periods of history, there can be discovered certain
ordering principles that organize all these different areas of knowledge. While
resemblance was the ordering principle up until the sixteenth century, this was replaced
by tabular classifications and categorizations later on. Foucault argues further that it was
during this period that ‘man’ entered the field of knowledge as an object to be studied,
and we see the discourses on man begin to appear.
We must note that Foucault’s work here is not about a history of ideas per se but
about what makes those ideas or knowledges possible. From a philosophical perspective,
one might say that Foucault’s questioning relates to epistemology, even though Foucault
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himself never uses this word to describe his work. The closest that Foucault comes to an
explicitly epistemological inquiry lies in his coinage of the term episteme or
‘epistemological field’ by which he refers to the conditions that lead to a particular
ordering of knowledge in specific periods. In Foucault’s words, he undertakes:
an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became
possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on what basis of
what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear,
sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies,… what I am
attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which
knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or
to its objective forms, grounds in positivity and thereby manifests a history which is
not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility (OT:
xxi-ii).
Instead of an epistemological inquiry, Foucault uses the archaeological method to study
the epistemological field, to work ‘from within’ discourses, to identify those conditions
of formation or rules and relations beyond grammar that make possible certain
statements. According to Foucault, during the Classical period, language was no longer
seen as a secondary comment on a primary text, but itself became a ‘discourse,’ a way of
speaking, arranging and presenting representations of the world in a logical order. In
Foucault’s early work, discourse appears as the “material verbal traces left behind by
history” (Farrell 2005: 133), which includes all that is said, while the rules of formation
of discourse determine what can be said, or what is possible to speak. However, what is
most important for us to note is how these “serious speech acts” (Dreyfus and Rabinow
1982: xxiv) produce certain knowledges or “truths.” To put it differently, more
significant than “what can be said” is the issue of how what is said within discourse
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becomes ‘true’ knowledge, providing us with some kind of “Truth;” this is the task that
Foucault undertakes.
The objective of Foucault’s inquiry into knowledge and the conditions of
possibility of knowledge is not to determine the verity of such knowledge. Neither is
Foucault concerned with an exegetical inquiry or “what the text truly says beneath what it
really says” (FL: 25, emphasis in the original). Rather, his project is to examine the
discourses that are so normalized in our everyday lives that they become invisible to us
and we do not think of questioning why we speak of certain things, leaving out other
possible statements. Thus Foucault’s analysis of discursive formations is neither
deconstructive nor hermeneutical. Instead, as I mentioned above, it is archaeological –
not as an excavation of subterranean things but dealing with archives, which for Foucault
is the accumulated existence of discourse:
By archives, I mean first the mass of things spoken in a culture, presented, valorized,
re-used, repeated and transformed. …How does it happen that at a given period
something could be said and something else has never been said? It is, in a word, the
analysis of the historical conditions that account for what one says or of what one
rejects, or of what one transforms in the mass of spoken things. The “archive” appears
then as a kind of great practice of discourse, a practice which has its rules, its
conditions, its functioning and its effects. (FL: 66)
What are these rules and conditions of formation of discourses, and what are their
effects?
In The Discourse on Language, Foucault talks about the rules governing
discourse, which include certain external and internal delimitations that have a significant
role to play in controlling and structuring all that is said. External delimitations work on
the exterior aspects of a discourse to systematize its ‘appearance.’ The most important
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category among external delimitations or the rules of exclusion is prohibition. Foucault
states:
[I]n every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected,
organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose
role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade
its ponderous, awesome materiality.
In a society such as our own we all know the rules of exclusion. The most
obvious and familiar of these concerns what is prohibited. We know perfectly
well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of
anything, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of
just anything. (DL: 216).
In other words, we are constrained by the regulations of the discourse, which determine
who can speak or who has the “privileged or exclusive right to speak,” on what “object”
or topic, and the “ritual with its surrounding circumstances” (216) determine when and
where we speak it; these prohibitions are also interrelated. For example, in Madness and
Civilization Foucault shows how the discourse around madmen transformed and
solidified into the pseudo-scientific discourse of psychiatry. Madness came to be
constituted as an illness around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from the earlier
perception of madmen as men of knowledge. It was now the doctors who were the men
of knowledge: they had the expertise to talk about madmen, and also to observe, control
and reform the madmen.
Another form of external delimitation that has an important role to play in our
present context is the “will to truth.” The answer to the question of “effects” of discourses
lies in this. Tracing the opposition between true and false from earlier Greek literature to
recent times, Foucault discusses the “will to knowledge,” or more generally, the “will to
truth” and how this gave rise to the empirical sciences. According to Foucault, “the
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highest truth no longer resided in what discourse was, nor in what it did: it lay in what
was said” and truth moved from the enunciated act to “what was enunciated itself: its
meaning, its form, its object and its relation to what it referred to” (DL: 218, emphasis in
the original). For example, in the discourse on sexuality, what is said by the doctors or
psychologists is taken as the truth about sex.
Foucault sees the will to knowledge as emerging out of the more general will to
truth. He suggests that the will to knowledge that we witness in the developments in
science could have arisen from some discoveries, but they could also have been “new
forms of the will to truth” (DL: 218). According to Foucault, around the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries
a will to knowledge emerged which… sketched out a schema of possible, observable,
measurable and classifiable objects; a will to knowledge which imposed upon the
knowing subject – in some ways taking precedence over all experience – a certain
position, a certain viewpoint, and a certain function (look rather than read, verify
rather than comment), a will to knowledge which prescribed (and, more generally
speaking, all instruments determined) the technological level at which knowledge
could be employed in order to be verifiable and useful (navigation, mining,
pharmacopoeia). (DL: 218)
Thus it is not that we have always been interested in knowing about certain things in
specific ways, but that over different periods, the objects under scrutiny can change as
does the way of approaching the problems. To put it differently, Foucault’s argument is
that through the operation of discourse we may even produce new objects of study.
There was a certain emphasis on measuring and classifying objects in the
Classical Age, which went together with the invention of instruments or new
technologies. As Foucault illustrates, with the rise of psychiatric discourse the utterances
of madmen became something to be listened to with great attention – in other words –
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they became objects of study. There is also the operation of a process of normalization
that delineates the objects of study. Foucault contends that in the case of madness reason
is normalized and opposed to unreason, while in the case of the discourse on sexuality,
the family becomes the norm.
Let us understand this process of normalization further. While earlier, concerns
about and discussions related to sex dealt solely with marriage — such as what one could
and could not do within and without the bonds of marriage, what were the imperatives for
a married couple, and similar issues — the later discourses increasingly focused on
sexuality outside the category of marriage:
The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality… tended to function as a
norm…Instead, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of children, mad men
and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those who did not like the opposite
sex; reveries, obsessions, petty manias, or great transports of rage. (HS: 38-9)
These other sexualities became the new objects of study, and paradoxically it was the act
of studying itself – a result of a growing “will to knowledge”– that led to the production
of these various sexualities, to what Foucault calls the “multiple implantation of
perversions” in our age (HS: 37). Consider for example certain rather exotic
classifications of sexualities: auto-monosexualists, mixoscopophiles, presbyophiles,
gynecomasts and other such “minor perverts whom nineteenth century psychiatrists
entomologized by giving them strange baptismal names” (HS: 43). All this was part of
the ‘scientific’ discourse on sexuality of those times.4
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It is useful here to note the original French subtitle of the first volume of the History of Sexuality: “will to
knowledge” (La volonté de savoir). This will to knowledge makes sexuality into a field of study within the
scientific discourse – a scientia sexualis in contrast to the ars erotica of the East – having an almost
obsessive preoccupation to talk about sex, observe, analyze and codify its every single detail, and wanting
above all a wealth of knowledge about sex.
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What is important to note is that the ‘will to knowledge’ performs a double role: it
produces ‘true discourses’ and in the process of this production masks itself so well that it
becomes invisible. Thus we are not conscious of the will to truth that gave rise to a
particular discourse from many possibilities, instead, that what has arisen is taken to be
the only truth. “Only one truth appears before our eyes… we are unaware of the
prodigious machinery of the will to truth, with its vocation of exclusion” (DL: 220). Thus
while the demarcation between true and false has been historically constituted, it works at
the unconscious or invisible level. We leave out or exclude from our utterances many
things that might have been said because of unnoticed controls and regulations. To sum
up, while Foucault foregrounded what is generally excluded from discourse, we should
keep in mind that his central project was to examine the “production of truth,” or in other
words, to examine the conditions that led to the emergence of a particular discourse.
In the case of madness, Foucault’s concern was to examine how the psychiatric
discourse became the ‘true’ discourse in observing and controlling ‘madmen’ and how
the discourse gave rise to ‘mental illness’ as an attributive phenomenon of the mad. We
should remember that for Foucault there is no fundamental ‘Truth’ out there, behind the
discourses, that we are simply unable to reach. Instead there are multiple ‘truths’ or
certain realities that are the products of various discourses.
Pierre Rivière (Foucault 1975) is a case in point. Pierre was a villager in
Normandy, France, who killed his mother, sister and brother with a pruning hook. Later
while in prison, he wrote a memoir giving reasons for his act. This was in the year 1835,
a time of transition from only the juridical discourse around crimes to the introduction of
the psychiatric discourse in order to verify the sanity or insanity of the criminal. Though
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Pierre was initially sentenced to death, the intervention of Paris psychiatrists led to the
modification of the sentence to life imprisonment. Foucault catalogs the growth of a
whole network of discourses around Pierre that purported to prove his sanity, insanity,
evilness, or idiocy. On the one hand, there were the opinions of villagers and local
doctors, on the other hand, there were the expert recommendations of the leading
psychiatrists in Paris. These various discourses led to two portraits, that of Rivière as
“criminal-having-given-way-to-the-propensities-of-his-evil-nature” and that of Rivière as
“deluded maniac” (PR: 234). “A threefold question of truth: truth of fact, truth of
opinion, and truth of science” (PR: 210) that was centered on Pierre’s acts and his text
struggled to find the truth of the matter.
Rivière’s case will be interesting to us later on in this thesis as well since it
provides parallels to the particular case that I will take up, that of Melissa Ann Rowland.
While 150 years ago there was still a turf war between justice and medicine and Pierre’s
madness was ambiguous, in the present times through the normalization of the discourse
on madness, through the “prodigious machinery” of the will to knowledge, we seem to
have no difficulty in labeling Melissa mad: only a madwoman would be willing to let her
‘baby’ die in order to avoid an operation.
The discourse of psychiatry also gives rise to certain effects of power. For
Foucault, power and knowledge are inextricably linked to each other, which is why he
uses the term “power-knowledge.” As Farrell (2005) states, there has been a “longstanding assumption in Western philosophy that there is a fundamental opposition
between knowledge and power, that the purity of knowledge can only exist in stark
opposition to the machinations of power” (96). However, Foucault rejects this

17

assumption as a myth. Foucault not only shows the mutuality between knowledge and
power, he rethinks the notion of power itself. Here again, Foucault’s analysis of power is
not simply a reversal of commonly held beliefs but is much more nuanced and complex.

Power: Not Prohibitive But Productive
As Farrell (2005) observes: “Foucault’s name is linked most famously with the notion of
power and also with the idea that knowledge and truth exist in an essential relation with
social, economic and political factors”(96). Though early on Foucault employs the classic
analysis of power as a repressive force, he later develops his own analysis to show how
power is also a productive force. In addition, contrary to the view of power as a thing that
one may or may not possess, or power as imperium, Foucault redefines power as a set of
relations, stating explicitly that “power is relations; power is not a thing” (FL: 410). He
contrasts it to the sovereign model of power. An explanation might be found in the
original French words for power, pouvoir and puissance. Foucault’s conception of power
can be said to be closer to the sense of pouvoir, which is a verb, while traditional
sovereign power or that which is vested in an authority is closer to puissance, a noun.5
Foucault also contrasts it to the “model of Leviathan… whose body is made up of
citizens but whose soul is sovereignty” (SMD: 34). According to Foucault, around the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there appeared new mechanisms of power that
focused on bodies and their product or on labor, rather than on land and agricultural
produce as was the case earlier.

5

For a well articulated difference between pouvoir and puissance from a philosophical perspective see
Hegy (1974).
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Foucault also distances himself from the Hegelian model of power within the
master-slave dialectic where power’s function is to prohibit, prevent, and isolate (AN:
51). Foucault points out the limitations in Marxist analyses of power as well, where what
is of primary concern is not relations of power but relations of production in terms of
economic interests which is not the same as power; ‘power’ in such analysis is “relatively
marginalized or… simplified” (FL: 410). In Foucault’s words,
power is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual’s consolidated and
homogeneous domination over others, or that of one group or class over others [recall
how Marx would say it’s a struggle between classes]…power…is not that which
makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it and those
who do not have it and submit to it. Power must be analyzed as something which
circulates, or rather, as something which only functions in the form of a chain.” (P/K:
98)
We should be careful about the word ‘individual’ as well. For Foucault, an individual is
an effect of power, a subject of relations of power, not an autonomous agent. An
articulation of this notion can be found in Nietzsche, whose insight of there being no doer
behind the deed shifts the emphasis from agency to a play of forces.6 In Foucault’s
words, “the subject is not one but split, not sovereign but dependent, not an absolute
origin but a function ceaselessly modified” (FL 67).
The chain that Foucault refers to in the above quote is the network of relations,
among parents and children, teachers and students, patients and doctors, and so on. We
must note that power is not an additional dimension that is added on to the relation, but is
immanent in the relation itself. As Foucault states, “relations of power are not in a
6

Nietzsche states: “A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effectmore, it is nothing
other than this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language … which
conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’ can
it appear otherwise. … But there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting,
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed.” (1989: 45)

19

position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes,
knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter” (HS: 94).
Thus, if we are to understand the relation between patient and psychiatrist in
Foucauldian terms, we cannot simply speak in terms of the latter having power over the
former. An example from Foucault’s own work may clarify this point. While in his
earlier works related to medicine there was the negative view of power, in later works
like the History of Sexuality Foucault shows that the relation between the psychiatrist and
the patient is not exactly the antithetical model of the former ‘having power over’ the
latter. Rather, there are “perpetual spirals of power and pleasure” (HS: 45, emphasis in
the original). As sexuality became an object of study under the medical or more
accurately psychiatric gaze, the confessions of the patient “renewed the questioner’s
curiosity” (44) while “so many pressing questions singularized the pleasures felt by the
one who had to reply” (45). Power and pleasure added to each other in the doctor-patient
relationship since “pleasure spread to the power that harried it; power anchored the
pleasure it uncovered” (45). Foucault shows that this is true of all confessions, and true in
the context of an array of spaces like the home, the school, or the clinic.
Instead of a top down or center to periphery model of power it is thus more useful
to visualize it in the form of capillaries. In Foucault’s words:
In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of
existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses,
learning processes and everyday lives. (P/K: 39)
Thus power is intimately connected with our lives, being embedded within certain
networks of relations. Just as there is no central point, neither are the capillaries ever
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reified; instead they are constantly moving, arising and dying out at certain locations at
different times, hence unstable. Foucault asserts that
Power’s condition of possibility… must not be sought in the primary existence of a
central point… it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and
unstable. (HS: 93)
Power can thus be better conceptualized as certain effects that are mostly transitory,
operating within every relationship, and not located or centralized.
What then about those figures of authority who do seem to have power over
others? For Foucault, the answer to this question lies in the different relative positions
and in the fact that both the person who is exercising power and the person on whom it is
exercised are subjected to the same technologies of power:
One doesn’t have here a power which is wholly in the hands of one person who can
exercise it alone and totally over others. It’s a machine in which everyone is caught,
those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised. …Power is
no longer substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises it by
right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns. Certainly everyone doesn’t
occupy the same position; certain positions preponderate and permit an effect of
supremacy to be produced. (P/K: 156)
Thus, as Foucault clarifies, even though power is not a thing someone can possess,
different relative positions can produce differential effects of power. According to
Foucault, institutions that seem to exercise a certain kind of power over us “are only the
terminal forms that power takes,” and in general, diffuse relations of power get
crystallized “in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social
hegemonies” (HS: 92-3). However, it is also true that power is usually most visible to us
in the form of the legal or state apparatuses. Foucault claims that the reason for this is that
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power hides itself otherwise. The legal and state “rituals” are visible while “the
deployments of power [are] reduced simply to the procedure of the law of interdiction,”
the effects of power working behind masks (HS: 86). Foucault offers a “general and
tactical reason for this that seems self-evident: power is tolerable only on condition that it
mask a substantial part of itself” (HS: 86). There is a necessary secrecy involved in the
operations of power, and indeed, in the appearance of sexuality as something secret, our
attention is drawn away from the various mechanisms of power that undergird it.
I should also point out that by differentiating his conception of power from the
sovereign model of power, Foucault does not imply that it is “derivative or in some sense
illusory phenomena” (Gordon 2000: xxv). Foucault’s emphasis lies elsewhere, to show
the new forms or modes of relations of power that can no longer be explained only by the
previously existing sovereign model of power. The relation between the patient and the
psychiatrist is one such example. Foucault identifies the
new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by
technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control,
methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state
and its apparatus. (HS: 89)
Foucault wants to show how “power ‘comes from below,’ that is, that global and
hierarchical structures of domination within a society depend on and operate through
more local, low-level, ‘capillary’ circuits of power relationship” (Gordon 2000: xxiv-v).
Foucault’s Nietzschean influence is most obvious at this point. From the earlier
archaeological analysis, Foucault shifts into a more genealogical analysis, dealing with
archives as well as non-discursive practices, including “institutions, political events,
economic practices and processes” (AK: 162). Instead of a grand sovereign imposing
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power from above, Foucault is interested in the “local, low-level” circuits of power,
evoking Nietzsche’s “pudenda origo,” that signifies “complex, mundane, inglorious
origins” (Gutting 2003: Section 3.2).
Instead of focusing on sovereign power, Foucault traces the appearance of
“disciplinary power” which is based on surveillance and has a new economy inscribed
within it, moving away from the “absolute expenditure of [sovereign] power” to that
which entails “minimum expenditure and maximum efficiency” (SMD: 36). Such an
economy of power evokes the notions of self-discipline and self-governance as we shall
see later.
Not only does Foucault draw our attention to the limitations of the sovereign
model of power, he rejects the juridical model as well since the latter is closely linked to
the former. Furthermore, the juridical model “presupposes that the individual is a subject
with natural rights or primitive powers; … and finally, it makes the law the basic
manifestation of power” (SMD: 265). However, this assumes the existence of an
autonomous individual which Foucault shows to be a problematic notion. Therefore,
according to Foucault, we should study power “in terms of technology, in terms of tactics
and strategy (FL: 207) instead of considering it within the framework of law.
The “Panopticon” that Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish is a good
example of diffused, agency-less power. The pan-opticon literally refers to the “gaze”
that is all encompassing, under which everything is made visible. The Panopticon was
conceived by Jeremy Bentham, a philosopher and social reformer of the late eighteenth
century, as a mechanism of observation in prisons. The plan included a central tower in a
courtyard surrounded by prison cells. Each cell was visible from the tower and thus a
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guard standing in the central tower could easily observe each inmate. However, inmates
could not see each other, and neither could they see if there was actually a guard in the
tower because of the lighting arrangement. As a result, prisoners always felt the gaze on
them, regardless of someone actually being in the tower. The disciplinary gaze was thus
internalized and power operated without there being a physical locus in the form of a
guard.
It is interesting to note that the panoptic itself was never constructed; however, the
phenomenon of panopticism can be found in almost all aspects of society. As Foucault
elaborates, surveillance is not only confined to prisons – it also operates in schools,
factories, hospitals, workshops, army barracks, and myriad other spaces. While earlier
power was visible and tangible, in the form of the sovereign king, we now have
disciplinary societies where power is invisible but its effects are felt on every one. Under
such panopticism,
There is no need for weapons, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each person feeling its weight will end up by
interiorising to the point of observing himself; thus each person will exercise this
surveillance over and against himself. (Foucault cited in Farrell 2004: 104)
We can argue that for the invisible gaze to be effective, it has to be supported by visible
physical constraints as well, especially in the context of the prison. In other words, only
the “inspecting gaze” may not be enough. Foucault does not address this issue
adequately, preferring to emphasize only how the principle of the panopticon is more
prevalent in our societies, in sharp contrast to the extremely violent and highly visible
modes of punishment that were exercised in earlier times. Also, for Foucault, the power
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that is wielded by the use of weapons is not exercised within relations of power but
through relations of violence.7
While we may thus comprehend how Foucault distances his analysis of power
from the sovereign model – whether we agree with it or not – another problem still
remains: that of understanding the prohibitions that exist in actuality. For Foucault,
prohibitions are just one of the multiple possible effects of power. What is important to
realize is that “the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms
of power, are only its limits: the frustrated or extreme forms of power. The relations of
power are, above all, productive” (FL: 220). And Foucault considers this analysis of
“effects of power and the production of ‘truth’ ” to be his primary project. Foucault
explicates that power relations
do not simply play a facilitating or obstructing role with respect to knowledge; they
do not merely encourage or stimulate it, distort or restrict it; … so the problem is not
just to determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its ends or
how it superimposes itself on it, imposing ideological contents and limitations. No
knowledge is formed without a system of communication, registration,
accumulation, and displacement that is in itself a form of power, linked in its
existence and its functioning to other forms of power. No power, on the other hand,
is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or restraint of a
knowledge. At this level there is not knowledge [connaissance] on one side and
society on the other, or science and the state, but the basic forms of “powerknowledge” [“pouvoir-savoir”]. (EW1: 17)
In other words, power and knowledge work together, supporting and drawing from each
other. To put it differently, “Foucault’s view is that mechanisms of power produce
7

See for example Foucault’s (1982) discussion of slavery in ‘Subject and Power.’ Foucault states, “slavery
is not a power relationship when man is in chains. (In this case, it is a question of a physical relationship of
constraint.)” (SP: 221).
Of course Foucault can be criticized on this, and Agamben (1998) does criticize him in this context.
But at the present moment, for the purpose of my analysis I would like to remain within the Foucauldian
framework, simply because any violent exercise of power is not really relevant in my biopolitical analysis,
as will become clear later.

25

different types of knowledge aimed at investigating and collecting information on
people’s activities and existence. The knowledge gathered in this way further reinforces
exercises of power” (Farrell 2005: 101). To explain further, we can understand it very
simply as that observation or study of something gives us knowledge about the object,
that in turn can be used to control the object and subject it to power, and this exercise of
power in turn can lead to greater knowledge of the subject.
The focus on children’s sexuality around the nineteenth century clearly illustrates
this point:
[a]t the crossroads of body and soul, of health and morality, of education and training,
children’s sexuality became at the same time a target and an instrument of power. A
specific “children’s sexuality” was established: it was precarious, dangerous, to be
watched over constantly. (FL: 216)
Thus teachers and parents, doctors and administrators became the guardians of children’s
sexuality, preventing or attempting to prevent the child’s moral and physical degeneracy
that was supposed to be a consequence of childhood masturbation. However, Foucault
demonstrates that the objective of such vigilance was not merely prohibitive. Instead, the
objective “was to constitute, through childhood sexuality suddenly become important and
mysterious, a network of power over children” (FL: 216). In other words, the enormous
amount of surveillance and control that went into it can be interpreted as power gaining a
foothold in the local, low-level domain that we discussed earlier. It can be viewed as an
advance of the mechanism of power, a mechanism that would pave the way for
ubiquitous and intense observation and administration later on. Foucault states,
the extraordinary effort that went into the task that was bound to fail leads one to
suspect that what was demanded of it was to persevere… relying on this support,
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power advanced, multiplied its relays and its effects… all around the child, indefinite
lines of penetration were disposed. (HS: 42, emphasis in the original)
This deployment of lines of penetration is one of the primary operations of power that
Foucault identifies. And according to Foucault, it is the sexuality of the adults that is
ultimately called into question by the intense focus on child sexuality. Thus we see the
intensification of the power/knowledge circuit and the production of objects of study.
Next I will turn our attention to the main focus of my thesis: the question of biopower.

The Rise of Biopolitics
According to Foucault, through an emphasis on medicine and an intense focus on the
body and sexuality came the state level apparatus that made life its primary concern.
Foucault contrasts it to the earlier periods where the monarch had power over death. Now
it was life that was the locus of interest. The sovereign’s “‘power of life and death’ was in
reality the right to take life or let live” (HS: 136). However, as the mechanisms of power
underwent transformation, “life-administering power” came to replace the sovereign’s
power over death. We now had a different kind of power,
whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through
and through. … the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now
carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated
management of life. (HS: 139-40, emphasis added).
What exactly does this “calculated management of life” imply? At one level, it refers to
the “numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the
control of populations” or what Foucault refers to as “bio-power” (HS: 140). In a larger
context, this “power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (HS: 138) has
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implications that reach out in many directions and involve numerous issues such as birth
control and euthanasia. Foucault states,
As soon as power gave itself the function of administering life, its reason for
being and the logic of its exercise…made it more and more difficult to apply the
death penalty. How could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting
people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put
this life in order? (HS: 138)
I now examine more closely this important role of power “to ensure, sustain, and multiply
life.”
This focus on life was not only due to a change in the attitudes of the bourgeoisie,
but also shaped by the developments taking place in the fields of medicine and
agriculture. As Foucault points out, in earlier times there was always a strong “pressure
exerted by the biological on the historical” in the form of epidemics or famines – in
general, there always was the threat of death (HS: 142). However, developments during
the eighteenth century in economic and agricultural productivity and resources that
outstripped population growth finally “allowed a measure of relief from these profound
threats.” And,
In the space for movement thus conquered, and broadening and organizing that
space, methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life
processes and undertook to control and modify them. (142)
It was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its
access to the body. (143)
And ultimately, “power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes” in
order to maximize or optimize life. Various interventions modified or regulated the
population at an optimal level, drawing from the discourses of statistics and demography,
which in turn led to intensified studies of the entire population. The biopolitical
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mechanisms included statistical estimates and forecasts that were used to modify the
necessary variables at the level of populations:
The mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to be increased;
the birth rate has to be stimulated. And most important of all, regulatory mechanisms
must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort
of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population and its
aleatory field. In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random
element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.
(SMD: 246)
How does this management of life play out in actuality? There are only too many
examples – such as immunization policies or those affecting birth rates – that support
Foucault’s thesis on this point.
Foucault observes that “a power whose task is to take charge of life needs
continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms” (HS: 144). Such mechanisms call for
a “judicial institution [that] is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses
(medical, administrative, and so on)” that regulate life. This continuum of apparatuses
and institutions was highly evident in the recent case of Theresa (Terri) Schiavo of
Florida, a 41-year-old brain-damaged woman. Though she had been brain dead for fifteen
years, there was a bitter and prolonged feud between her husband and her parents over
her right-to-life as opposed to her right-to-end-life. As John Parry (2005), a legal scholar,
comments, “the questions of whether Schiavo was already ‘dead,’ or as good as dead, or
whether, if she was still ‘alive,’ her life was worth living, were debated around the
country” (874). In the legal battle that ensued, numerous doctors – the medical “experts”
with the right to speak – testified about Schiavo’s health condition. The entire legal,
administrative and state machinery was involved, right from the lower courts to the
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Supreme Court, through to the passing of a relevant Bill in Congress, and the President’s
signing it into a law.
Further, Parry (2005) analyzes certain court cases dealing with the issue of
legislating marijuana use for pain relief as well as end of life decisions employing the
Foucauldian biopolitical framework. Mentioning the Schiavo case, he states that the point
is not whether she “had already died in some obvious and objective sense,” precisely
because “if death is subject to regulation, then so too is the definition of death itself”
(875n).8
Though this is not a criminal case, we can see the play of Foucault’s “juridicomedical discourse” that ultimately decided Terri’s fate. “After her injury, she could only
exist—and could only die—within a matrix of pervasive and invasive legal and medical
regulation” (Parry 2005: 874). We can also relate this case to Foucault’s comments on the
death of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in the context of his lectures on
biopolitics:
Thanks to a power that is not simply scientific prowess, but the actual exercise of the
political biopower established in the eighteenth century, we have become so good at
keeping people alive that we’ve succeeded in keeping them alive when, in biological
terms, they should have been dead long ago. [… Franco] fell under the influence of a
power that managed life so well, that took so little heed of death, and he didn’t even
realize that he was dead and was being kept alive after his death. (SMD: 248-49).
The parallel is interesting to note. Terri was “a woman who suffered a heart attack 15
years ago, who essentially died but was resuscitated, though not entirely”9 and it is solely

8

See Kaufman and Morgan (2005) for a detailed discussion of how the distinction between life and death is
reworked in legal and medical discourses.
9
Matt Conigliaro (no date) Abstract Appeal: The Terri Schiavo Information Page
Retrieved on September16, 2006 from <http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/infopage.html>
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medical technology that kept her alive all these years. After considering the doctors’
reports that there was no hope of recovery, and without intending to be cynical, one can
perhaps say that in the enormous legal and state apparatus that went into high gear to
‘save’ Terri’s life is reflected Foucault’s words that “death is power’s limit, the moment
that escapes it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence, the most “private”
(HS: 138) and thus we try to avert it by whatever means necessary.
To conclude my explication of the Foucauldian framework, we saw that around
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there emerged multiple discourses around the
body. The will to knowledge made sexuality an object of intense observation and study.
Various truths were produced within the discourses which made possible the control and
regulation of individuals, ‘individuals’ being the vehicle for the exercise of power,
subjects of relations of power. The mechanisms of power were unlike sovereign power,
which through the techniques of surveillance of bodies exercised control and modified
their actions, giving rise to what Foucault calls disciplinary power. Foucault then traces
another development: through the growth of modern medicine, it was now possible to
regulate the population in order to maximize life itself. Techniques for maximizing life
worked through the dense networks of power-knowledge around the body, giving rise to
biopolitics.
We also considered the case of Terri Schiavo where there was an intense battle to
prolong ‘life,’ involving a range of juridical and medical apparatus, and where death
itself could not be defined, could not be determined except within the biopolitical
framework. But ultimately it is life itself that is the primary focus of biopolitics. The case
of Melissa Ann Rowland, as we shall see, is exemplary of biopolitics. But before we
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analyze this particular case, in the next chapter I will briefly review some of the existing
literature that employ a Foucauldian framework to analyze events and developments in
discourses surrounding health, clinical practices, and reproduction.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MEDICALIZATION OF MATERNITY

Foucault mentioned more than once that he intended his theorization to be applied or
utilized, and not just to be read. In Foucault’s words,
I would like my books to be a kind of tool box which others can rummage through
to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area … I would
like [my work] to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious
objector. I don’t write for an audience, I write for users, not readers. (Foucault 1974:
523-4)
Thus what Foucault emphasizes was the active use of his work for analysis. Even if we
are not simply an ‘audience,’ our interaction with theory, especially philosophical work,
remains mostly at the level of “conventional scholarly practices of commentary, exegesis,
interpretation and criticism;” however, keeping in mind Foucault’s words above, to use
them as ‘tool box’ might be a “more fruitful and interesting way of approaching
[Foucault’s] texts” (Dean 1996: 209). And there exists a large body of work that uses the
specific tool box of biopolitics. I shall look at a sampling of this literature that relates to
a biopolitical analysis of social reality.
As we saw in the previous chapter, issues of life and death are now included in
political thinking. Also included under such ‘biopolitics’ are all issues that fall within the
spectrum of life and death and relate to humans as living bodies. In the existing literature,
some of the major focus areas subjected to biopolitical analysis have been those of
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reproduction, medicine, health and hygiene.10 While these are some obvious areas of
study, there are also studies that use biopolitics to study crime-related issues –
representing a shift from the framework of discipline and punishment – and I include one
of these to show just how prevalent the use of Foucauldian biopolitical lens is, and also
how widespread the regulation of our lives are.
The analysis of crime prevention in Denmark by Christian Borch (2005) is one
such example. While previously eugenic measures had been undertaken to reduce the
perceived antisocial population through the regulation of reproduction,11 Borch describes
how crime prevention tactics now target schools and communities to intervene “early
enough… and efficiently” (97). Government recommendations encompass all aspects of
living in the neighborhood from “glass facades” to decorated staircases to many others in
order to discourage crimes. And the local population is viewed as “[taking] on the
identity of (actual or potential) crime victims” (99) that changes almost everything from
“our health, our identities, the way we live, the number of storeys in dwelling areas, the
pitches of roofs, the way we move, how and to what extent we interact, the relations to
our neighbours and to the local environment (community) in general, the way we play,
etc., etc.” (102). Borch argues that such intense focus on nearly every dimension of daily
life is a reflection of “totalitarian biopolitics.”
Just as there is an all-encompassing nature to the preventive strategies outlined
above, there are similar techniques at work in the world of professional athletes to control
the problem of drug use. As Park (2005) argues, there is a “global culture of surveillance”
10

See for example Armstrong (2005) and Elbe (2004) who discuss cancer and AIDs respectively
employing a Foucauldian lens.
11

as happened for instance in Sweden; see my discussion of Rose (2001) below.
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in the context of “governing doped bodies” (175). Park suggests that the “governance of
the health of the social body in the form of sport is a prime instance of the arts of
government” (177). He shows how The World Anti-Doping Agency regulates the
activities of the athletes, including the conduct of “unannounced, out-of-competition
testing among elite athletes” in the name of maintaining their health and promoting ethics
in sports (179). Park attempts to understand the problem in terms of a Foucauldian
analytics of governmentality that has “the strategic management of the population as [its]
ultimate end” (175). Thus it is not a biopolitical analysis as such that Park undertakes, but
rather one based on the closely related Foucauldian notion of governmentality.
While biopolitics implies the technologies for managing populations including
life and reproduction, governmentality might be defined as the management of
populations through the triple axes of health, security and wealth. According to Foucault,
the art of government calls for the addition of the “competitive state (economically and
militarily)” to the principle of a welfare state (EW1: 70). However, Foucault uses the
term governmentality in a very general manner, where it almost becomes an umbrella
term that includes how the “conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick” (EW3: 221).
We can thus conclude that the concept of biopolitics falls within the broader general
framework of governmentality.
Moreover, As Lemke (2001: 191) clarifies, the term governmentality connects the
idea of “governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’)” or political
rationality. In other words, the term ‘governmentality’ highlights the workings of a
rationality or a justification for the exercise of power. On the one hand, subjects are
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supposed to be free, but on the other hand, there are increasing tendencies to monitor and
regulate the actions of Foucauldian subjects. Thus, intervention by the government is
possible or allowable on the basis of an economy of governance, as Foucault specifies,
and this operates with maximum efficiency in the regime of liberalism. According to
Foucault, the most efficient and economical strategies of governance arise in the form of
self governance.
This governing of the self is most clearly brought out in a study by David
McGillivray (2005), who explores the problems of health, especially wellness, in terms of
governmentality. Within the particular domain of the workplace, McGillivray describes
the recent developments that introduce techniques of wellness to produce “fitter, happier,
[and] more productive” bodies (125). Corporate “wellness initiatives” include “material
resources (e.g. gyms)” (132) as well as encouraging general lifestyle changes.
McGillivray points out that “discourses of health promotion, focused on both societal
regulation (i.e. alleviating major health risks) and self-surveillance (i.e. individual
responsibility for health maintenance) represent the perfect bedfellow for employers
concerned with minimizing the burden of employee healthcare costs” (131-2). The
objective of the organizational initiatives relating to wellness is to urge the subjects “to
govern their own productive capacities” (125), echoing Foucault’s notion of
governmentality where one governs oneself in addition to being governed by others.
McGillivray thus moves away from a positivistic or functionalist approach to the issue of
workplace health promotion and employs the framework of governmentality.
Let us now review the literature that relates to reproduction in general and
pregnancy in particular.
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The Regulation of Reproduction
The older project of eugenics, and more recently, the human genome project have been
analyzed from the biopolitical perspective by Nikolas Rose (2001). Rose identifies
eugenics as one of the two major strategies of twentieth century “state-sponsored”
biopolitics, the other being hygienic strategies that linked state level health concerns to
the individual modes of action. While hygienic strategies were aimed at improving health
through town-planning, or through instilling ‘good habits’ at home and at schools,
eugenic strategies focused on the site of reproduction.
Rose describes the “pastoral eugenics” that was undertaken in Sweden from 1935
to 1975 as an example. The program covered a total of 62,000 women, most of them
coerced into it; the objective of the program being to reduce the family-size “of those
with a history of anti-social behavior.” Those women who were seen as “anti-social,
sexually active and without good judgement” (23n) were sterilized involuntarily under
this program. It is interesting to compare these characteristics to Foucault’s description of
the moral monster who has both unnatural and criminal traits in him/her (AN: 81). The
person is viewed as a pervert and exists at the margins of society. Foucault shows that
eugenics as a “medical theory which was scientifically lacking and improperly
moralistic” (HS: 118) justified the regulation of a population in the name of “biological
responsibility” to the species. It was believed that “sexual perversion resulted in the
depletion of one’s line of descent” (HS: 118) and thus through eugenic techniques, the
risk of potential future afflictions had to be minimized.
Rose (2001) points out that while the Swedish program of sterilization is a
particular example of “negative eugenic measure” (4), there are “positive eugenic
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measures” like policy incentives and family allowances as well. Nevertheless, the
regulatory technologies are clearly evident in both. Rose also introduces the notion of
“ethopolitics” within biopolitics, which as he explains are
the self-techniques by which human beings should judge themselves and act upon
themselves to make themselves better than they are. … In advanced liberal
democracies, biological identity becomes bound up with more general norms of
enterprising, self-actualizing, responsible personhood. (Rose 2001: 19, emphasis
added)
It is important to note the words “responsible personhood.” In terms of reproduction and
pregnancy, we can relate this to the responsible mother who, as we witnessed in the
previous chapter, is responsible not only for her child’s health but the health of the
population as well.
Rose’s analysis highlights the ubiquity of biopolitics in contemporary society so
much so that in a way, it has become difficult to even think about certain issues outside
this frame of reference. He gives the examples of “natural foods” and “natural
childbirth.” As Rose states, “even choosing not to intervene in living processes becomes
a kind of intervention… Our very ideas of what it is to be a normal human being have
been made possible by historically specific institutional and technical developments, not
least by biopolitics itself” (19). Childbirth is an especially significant site for biopolitical
techniques as it is the process that is central to the production of life – the main focus of
biopower. Thus we find dense networks of power-knowledge that keep a pregnant
woman under constant surveillance through various means. I shall now discuss four
studies that focus specifically on pregnancy.
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Four Studies on Pregnancy
Lorna Weir (1996) undertakes a review of recent developments in the government of
pregnancy. Weir identifies three axes of change within the discourse of pregnancy: the
first relating to the fetus, another to antenatal risk management and the third to the liberal
governance of pregnancy. Weir highlights that “the foetus does not exist in most
jurisdictions as a legal person, but it is an object of government” (373). She argues that
the “public foetus” is both an object and an effect of biomedical technologies. Through
numerous medical examinations a variety of “physiological and pathological properties”
are conferred upon the fetus.
Weir studies these developments through the Foucauldian lens and states that the
“struggles to govern pregnancy consistently with patient autonomy/freedom” operate
within the political rationality of liberalism (373). Weir’s objective is to shift the feminist
focus from medical technologies to the “means by which the conduct of pregnancy is
organized” (375). She believes that the framework of liberalism can provide us with a
more significant analysis of the continued medicalization and pathologization of
women’s bodies. Weir shows that just as the fetus is an object within biomedicine, the
“pregnant body has become the subject” of various medical interventions (379). In other
words, we can say the fetus is an object of knowledge while the pregnant woman is a
subject of power; however, Weir herself does not connect her work explicitly to
Foucault’s notion of power-knowledge. A biopolitical analysis based on a Foucauldian
understanding of power might give us a more powerful tool to understand the medical
discourse of pregnancy and the role of the pregnant woman within it, as I will show in the
next chapter. Moreover, Weir documents that until a few decades back, medical
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knowledge of the foetus was mostly “mediated through the speech of pregnant women”
(376) in sharp contrast to the present where various scientific discourses like
“cytogenetics, biochemistry and molecular biology” provide us with the said knowledge.
The implication of this development becomes clearer once we realize that “‘truth’ is
[now] centered on the form of scientific discourse” (EW3: 131), within which the speech
of a pregnant woman cannot be considered as a “serious speech act” (Dreyfus and
Rabinow 1982: xxiv). However, Weir does provide us with a useful medical history of
the subjectification of the fetus.
Lealle Ruhl’s (1999) study focuses on the pregnant woman. Ruhl examines the
various discourses around maternity including medical advice on diet, exercise, lifestyle
and personal habits, as well as the popular advice manuals aimed at pregnant women.
Ruhl brings into sharp focus the element of self-regulation and shows how the discourses
serve to produce a “responsible” pregnant woman (95). From a Foucauldian standpoint,
she asserts that the medical discourse of risk surrounding pregnancy hides certain “moral
regulatory impulses” behind it, and also implicitly equates the notion of responsibility to
“the capacity to behave rationally” (96). In other words, we can surmise that within the
highly medicalized discourse of maternity, not taking “proper care” of oneself would
imply that the pregnant woman is not quite rational. Melissa Ann Rowland’s refusal to
heed the doctor’s advice and her abuse of drugs during pregnancy can then be interpreted
as irrational and irresponsible acts which is exactly how the media framed it as we will
find out in the next chapter.
Ruhl draws our attention to the significant fact that “the subject of risk reduction
is not the pregnant woman; the effort here is not to reduce maternal risk during
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pregnancy, but rather to reduce possible risks to the foetus due to maternal behaviour”
(95). Ruhl associates this development to the “proliferation of [medical] technologies”
that makes it possible for us to “see (metaphorically and literally) the foetus as a distinct
being, vulnerable and dependent, yes, but separate from the mother” (113). According to
her, this perception has led to a specific concern for the fetus that was not as prevalent
earlier. Ruhl asserts that this concern surfaces in an extreme form in the “medical
discussions of the ‘advantages’ … of caesarian sections over vaginal delivery” (113). In
other words, a caesarian section is considered beneficial for the welfare of the fetus; the
fetus becoming a distinct subject of study as a result of advanced diagnostic technologies.
Ilpo Helén (2004) takes up this strand of advanced medical technology and shows
how it affects antenatal care, especially in the context of selective abortion. She analyses
abortion as an illustration of “vital politics” – the new form of biopolitics that Rose
(2001) introduces. For Rose, vital politics operates at the molecular level through the
apparatuses of biotechnology (20-22). Helén contends that there is an “ethical split” in
the care of the fetus: the reproductive health care system has a “technical responsibility”
in diagnosing the fetal health while the pregnant woman is given the “ethical
responsibility” of deciding whether or not to have an abortion in case a pathology is
discovered (2004: 37).
According to Helén, the medical discourse around pregnancy has shifted to
“dispersed practices of constant monitoring and modulation” from the earlier
disciplinary mode of “corrective and normalizing interventions” (30, emphasis in the
original). By modulation, she refers to the “moulding of living conditions” through the
management of risks and uncertainties. Risk minimization has a large role to play which

41

works through predictive diagnostic techniques. Helén shows that advanced genetic or
molecular technologies have shifted the medical focus to “specific molecular elements
that are considered biologically fundamental” (34, emphasis in the original). In this
“geneticized” discourse of pregnancy, the pregnant woman becomes the peculiar subject
who is provided with a choice, “and is also compelled” to exercise that choice (38).
Invoking Rose (2001), we can say that in such cases even “non-intervention” becomes a
kind of intervention. While such developments in biotechnology impose a certain
responsibility on the pregnant woman, the question of drug use during pregnancy also
relates to the concept of responsible motherhood.
Roe Sybylla (2001) examines the issue of pregnant drug users and critiques the
liberal-humanist approach to the problem. She advocates a feminist perspective of ethical
care drawing upon Foucault’s understanding of freedom. Sybylla realizes the charged
nature of the particular problem she has chosen, and given that, she correctly points out
the necessity of questioning “what it is we take for granted at the most fundamental
levels” (69). Sybylla situates her critique against a particular analysis of pregnant drug
users by Iris Marion Young which she problematizes as liberal-humanistic. As Sybylla
points out, the liberal discourse reverts back to “the status quo [by accepting at a
fundamental level] the state’s right to intervene” (69). The question is only of deciding on
the ethical form of intervention, while intervention itself “as a part of modern rationality”
is not challenged. Thus Sybylla emphasizes the need to “interrogate the conceptual
framework” that formulates the question of ethics (71). Yet, while Sybylla accuses
Young of discounting “the incisive points of Foucault’s analysis” (69), she herself strays
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dangerously close to doing the same. An example will clarify my point. Considering the
notion of “human,” Sybylla states:
To define what humans are and to prescribe what they should aim to be and do….is
unsatisfactory to thinkers of many different persuasions. However, my objection goes
further: it is to the very notion of defining human beings in this essential and
ahistorical way. (71-2)
Thus Sybylla seems to go towards a Foucauldian understanding of “human,” but without
developing this line of thought any further, she falls back into a certain kind of
humanism. Continuing from the above quote, Sybylla expresses her objection to such
essential and ahistorical definitions of humans by saying that
Not only does this deny difference, but, because humans are complex and amazing
beings, such efforts to define them closely inevitably diminish and limit their
possibilities. (72)
Instead of a promised Foucauldian critique, we are thus left with a modified version of
liberal humanism. Ultimately, Sybylla’s position appears to be more Levinasian than
Foucauldian as she calls for empathy toward pregnant drug users, empathy understood as
“a sensitive, intelligent, and responsive openness to what the other says” (73).
Thus we find that even though the above studies grapple with issues that are quite
similar to my problem – that is, to think differently about maternity and pregnant women
– and invoke Foucault to a lesser or greater extent, none of them explore the connection
between power and knowledge, preferring to remain with a critique of knowledge alone.
Yet as Foucault shows us,
truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power… ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular
relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power
which it induces and which extend it–a ‘regime’ of truth. (EW3: 132).

43

If we are to carry out a Foucauldian analysis, we must understand this circularity
of power and knowledge. And though the analyses above refer to governmentality, I
argue that a biopolitical analysis is better suited to understanding the medicalization of
maternity, since firstly, governmentality is too broad a concept to be useful as a “tool
box,” and secondly, power takes a back seat in this notion, according to Farrell (2005).
Farrell comments that the “term [governmentality] mutates in [Foucault’s] work into a
discussion of freedom, truth and the subject, and ways of guiding one’s own and others’
conduct, leaving discussions of power behind” (107).
Lastly, let us consider some very particular developments in medical practices
relating to pregnancy. In the context of the increasing focus on fetal welfare, Weir draws
our attention to medical practices that include
the forced obstetrical treatment of pregnant women, involuntary confinement of
pregnant women regarded as engaging in behavior violating foetal health needs and
the maintenance of dead pregnant women or women near death on life-support
systems. (Weir 1996: 386, emphasis added)
Weir describes these practices as “violations” of the freedom conferred on pregnant
women within the liberal regime. However, through the lens of a biopolitical analysis, we
can understand the extreme practice of “maintaining” dead pregnant women as in keeping
with the objective of maximizing life. It is no longer a matter of conferring freedom on
pregnant women, rather in a biopolitical regime the pregnant women are nothing but
“vehicles” for the exercise of power whose ultimate aim is to maximize life. The
preservation of a fetus through whatever means can then be interpreted as one local
strategy of biopolitics.
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Let us therefore turn our attention to Melissa Ann Rowland whose case
exemplifies Foucault’s discussion of biopower and thus helps us understand how life
itself is at the center of our current politics.

45

CHAPTER 3
THE MONSTER MOTHER
The hysterization of women, which involved a thorough medicalization of their
bodies and their sex, was carried out in the name of the responsibility they owed
to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution, and the
safeguarding of society.
(Foucault, History of Sexuality)

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against
which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. The
individual is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. In
other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application.
(Foucault, Power/Knowledge, mod.)

Foucault, while discussing his analytics of power, included a “methodological
precaution” that we should take up the study of power “at its extremities, in its final
destinations, [at] those points where it becomes capillary… in its more regional and local
forms and institutions;” rather than examine its central points or nodes (P/K: 96). In this
chapter I undertake such an analysis of power at its very local mode of operation through
a study of the case of Melissa Ann Rowland. Melissa was arrested over the death of the
fetus she was carrying and was subsequently released on probation. My objective is to
bring into focus the operations of power-knowledge that make Melissa into a subject of
power through the objectification of her pregnancy in the medical discourse. Just as
Foucault highlighted the “threefold question of truth: truth of fact, truth of opinion, and
truth of science” (PR: 210) in his analysis of Rivière, I will now analyze Melissa’s case
from a similar perspective.
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This, then, is the “truth of fact:” In January 2004, Melissa, a woman from Utah,
was advised more than once by her doctor to have a caesarean section. However, Melissa
delayed the operation. Later, one of the twins she was carrying was delivered stillborn.
She was charged with criminal homicide and arrested in March 2004, and was finally
acquitted on probation and recommended to a rehabilitation program on account of her
“mental illness.”
The “truth of opinion” is that Melissa refused the surgery because she did not
want a scar, according to a nurse who had overheard her. Melissa denied this statement
saying that she had already had two C-sections. The prosecutor accused her of “depraved
indifference to human life.” The public opinion around Melissa labeled her as “selfish,
whimsical, disturbed, evil, mad, idiot, ….” (Pollitt 2004)12 closely echoing Pierre
Riviere’s reception after his parricide a hundred and fifty years back. Public opinion was
fed by a “mug shot” of Melissa that was widely televised and was available on the
Internet. As one reporter remarks, “the media has dutifully run photos of Rowland in a
pinkish prison jumpsuit; hair splayed out in all directions [and under harsh
lighting]...fulfilling any spectator’s notion of what a mother with ‘depraved indifference
to human life’ might look like.” (Mickey Z 2004). The image can be found archived in an
internet site under the classification “criminal/psychos.”13 This is an interesting
characterization when seen in the light of the double portrait of Rivière – as a criminal or

12

I refer to various newspaper articles retrieved online for information on Rowland. Since most of the
information I quote appear in several articles, I have not cited each specific reference. Instead I give a list
of all the articles referred to under a separate section in References.
13

www.mugshots.com/Criminal/ psychos/Melissa+Ann+Rowland.htm
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as a madman. However, while there was a prolonged debate over Rivière’s madness,
public opinion easily labeled Melissa mad-criminal simultaneously.
The “truth of science” offers a lot of “expert” opinions. Melissa should have
agreed to the surgery as soon as the doctors recommended it, since they are the experts.
They are the “medicine men” and as Foucault mentions, this spectacular attention to life
and to body was made possible in the first place by the development of medicine.
Further, Foucault characterizes the contemporary liberal regime as where the exercise of
power is most efficient. This operates through the governing of the self, though with the
help of certain experts. In other words, there is “a [presupposition of the] willingness to
turn to experts for advice in the decisions, both large and small, that are entailed in the
conduct of the enterprise of one’s life” (Rose and Miller 1994: 60). In such a context,
Melissa’s unwillingness to “turn to experts” is an instance of resistance to such subtle
mechanisms of power that then sets in motion the not-so-subtle disciplinary techniques.
But then there are “truths” about Melissa herself, and it is worth showing the
parallels with the Rivière case that Foucault describes, even though the crimes are not
comparable. The psychiatrists in Pierre’s case found it necessary to draw up an account
of his entire life starting from his childhood continuing right up to his crime, making his
life story an object of psychiatric study. There were a lot of “bizarre” behaviors narrated
by witnesses (PR: 234).
In Melissa’s case, we are told that her mother was retarded, that Melissa herself
has a history of mental disturbance, that she was estranged from her family, that she was
institutionalized at the age of 12, gave birth to twins at the age of 14, that she has suicidal
tendencies and has attempted suicide twice. She has a history of substance abuse and
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there are accusations of child abuse as well. We find here the perfect example of a
“hysterical woman, ” with “a pathology intrinsic” to her (HS: 104). The image of Melissa
as a mad woman is confirmed over and over again through the circulation of her
photograph as well as the circulation of discourse surrounding her. One newspaper article
puts it in these words: “in the public eye, Rowland is a monster mother: sexual, selfish,
whimsical.” Thus she seems to be the epitome of the “new personage” discovered by
psychiatry that Foucault describes – “then these new personages made their appearance:
the nervous woman, the frigid wife, the indifferent mother – or worse, the mother beset
by murderous obsessions” (HS: 110). We hear stories of how Melissa “punched” her
daughter for having taken a candy bar at a store, we read reports of alcohol and drugs
found in the blood of her newborn daughter, and hear rumors that she had already sold
the twins to an adoption agency even before giving birth to them.
Thus Melissa’s case strikingly illustrates one of the “great strategic unities
which… formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” (HS:
103), relating to the hysterization of the female body. In Melissa we find certain
technologies of power-knowledge that make the female body a subject of power and an
object of knowledge. As Foucault notes, the hysterical woman – being described as a
body “thoroughly saturated with sexuality” – enters the discourse of medicine and
psychiatry to be observed, studied, controlled, and subjected to medical intervention.
Specifically, Melissa’s subjectivity is highlighted in her role of a “Mother,” which is “the
most visible form of this hysterization” – the mother who has the “biologico-moral
responsibility” to guarantee the life of the child as well as to guarantee the continuation
of the social body (HS: 104).
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Melissa’s case is also interesting because it is in the medical, legal and public
discourses surrounding her that we simultaneously find the features of criminality,
abnormality, and danger. Melissa the subject is at once a mad monster mother. Foucault
explains how in the disciplinary society, the technologies of discipline operate through
the mechanism of normalization, not through the code of law. And normalization is a
feature of the clinical discourse, not of the legal one.
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault traces the genealogy of the modern notion of a
crime – which is no more a crime committed against the sovereign king, but against the
society as a whole. The criminal is thus framed as an antisocial element, dangerous and
monstrous. This development is also tied up to psychiatry’s entry into the legal discourse.
Foucault’s finds that the modern criminal justice system has to constantly refer to
“something other than itself,” it has to be “redefined by knowledge” of the human
sciences (DP: 22). This function gives rise to a new object of study, the criminal, and
exercises its power differently from what is found in the juridical or sovereign system. As
Foucault demonstrates, from the focus on the offense and the relevant penalty, the
intervention of the psychiatric discourse into the criminal justice shifts the latter’s focus
to a third, as yet unconsidered aspect: the ‘criminal.’ At this point, the crime itself
becomes unimportant, nothing more than “a shadow,” a signaling event, that warns us
about the existence of “a dangerous element,” which is the only thing that is “now of
importance, the criminal” (EW3: 178). And thereafter the consequent action does not deal
with the conformity of the criminal to legal codes but rather measures the monstrosity or
the abnormality of the criminal in terms of a deviation from the “norm.” Hence arises the
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need to reform and rehabilitate the criminal rather than punishing him/her to serve as an
example for potential offenders.
In Melissa’s case we find that both poles of the technologies of power, the
disciplinary and the biopolitical, converge. As Foucault clarifies,
[the biopolitical] technology of power does not exclude … disciplinary technology,
but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it
by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques….
Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is
applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately,
if you like, to man-as-species. (SMD: 242)
Thus disciplinary technique is not replaced by biopower or biopolitics; rather biopolitics
gets its support from the existing disciplinary technologies. In Melissa’s case, on the one
hand, there is the disciplinary or the “body-organism-discipline-institutions” pole as
Foucault puts it that individualizes Melissa and serves to discipline her, giving rise to an
“anatomo-politics of the human body” (SMD: 250). On the other hand, the prosecution’s
emphasis on her “depraved indifference to human life” brings out the hysterical mother
who is the vehicle for the exercise of biopower. Her apparent indifference to life itself
puts her in circulation within biopower or the “population-biological processes-regulatory
mechanisms-State,” that is the second pole of “biopolitics” (SMD: 250).
Related to the above is the implication of Melissa’s action as “antinatural and
irrational.” According to Foucault, “the monstrous crime [...that is] both antinatural and
irrational, is the meeting point of the medical demonstration that insanity is ultimately
always dangerous” (EW3: 189). In Melissa’s case, through repeated references to the
problem of her drug abuse, her previous counts of child endangerment, and her suicidal
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tendencies, this dangerous aspect is highlighted. Melissa is shown to be a danger to
herself and her children.
Ultimately, it is Melissa’s sentencing that exemplifies Foucault’s analysis most
clearly. While Melissa was initially charged with murder that carried five years to life
imprisonment, she was actually sentenced to eighteen months’ probation for lesser counts
of child endangerment and was also ordered into a drug treatment program. In other
words, we find two different responses to Melissa: one “expiatory” and the other
“therapeutic” – which Foucault identifies as the two poles of society’s response to
“pathological criminality,” (AN: 34). Again, what is important to note is the aspect of
danger: if only a criminal, the expiatory response would suffice, and if only mad, then
only the therapeutic would be called for. In Foucault’s words, “this continuum with its
therapeutic and judicial poles, this institutional mixture, is actually a response to danger”
(AN: 34).
We should note that even though Melissa is not imprisoned, under both the poles
of the technologies of power that we saw above there is a different kind of exercise of
power and subjectification of her, as she is put under constant observation that is a
different kind of surveillance. The “infinite lines of penetration of power” that we
discussed in the first chapter is made visible in the case of Melissa through a Foucauldian
biopolitical analysis. In the context of infantile sexuality, Foucault shows the formation
of a complex apparatus around the child that is the “entire watch-crew of parents, nurses,
servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of [the child’s]
sex” (HS: 98). Similarly, we now have around the pregnant woman the entire watch-crew
of doctors, nurses, diagnosticians, police, judges, prosecutors, psychiatrists, social
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workers and family members who are all attentive to her least “infractions.” In the
modern disciplinary society, Melissa is thus subjected to what Foucault identifies as
“gentle punishment” through the “multiple mechanisms of ‘incarceration’” (DP: 308).
Through a discussion of cases like Rivière and Rowland, we get a “glimpse into
the … psychiatrization of law, the medicalization of crime, and the therapeutization of
justice” as Szasz accurately states (Backcover of “I Pierre Rivière having
slaughtered…”). And all these converge under the “regulatory control” of biopolitics. As
Foucault demonstrates, biopolitics signifies
the entry of life into history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of
the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of
political techniques. (HS: 141-42)
Melissa’s case exemplifies this subjectification of life through the apparatuses of powerknowledge. The public discourse around Melissa was divided between those who
demonized her as the monster mother deserving punishment, and those who were
sympathetic toward her, reading her past as an outcome of social conditions of poverty,
absence of child support and other social factors, thus viewing her as someone in need of
treatment rather than punishment. However, in discussing her case here, my intention has
not been to portray Melissa in either a sympathetic or a condemning light. Rather, my
purpose has been to complicate the apparently obvious or “normal” ideas about the
relationships among medicine, criminality, maternity and the role of government so as to
critique the assumptions that frame the above two views of Melissa. My aim was to
foreground the numerous local, tactical and low level networks of power that constantly
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operate around us, monitoring, regulating, and even producing us as subjects within
particular discourses making us both the effects and the instruments of power-knowledge.
We found that the lines of penetration of power that Foucault identified seem to
reach deeper and wider than ever before. The murder charges and subsequent media
coverage took Melissa by surprise since her decision to delay an operation on her body
seemed to be her “private business.” Yet we should not be surprised by it once we have
the theoretical tools to analyze the situation: it is death that is “most private,” the most
secret, and the “limit” of power. “Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power
establishes its dominion” (HS: 138).
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CONCLUSION

Philosophy’s question… is the question as to what we ourselves are. That is
why contemporary philosophy is entirely political and entirely historical. It is
the politics immanent in history and the history indispensable to policies.
(Foucault, Telos)
But, after all, this was the proper task of a history of thought, as against a
history of behaviors or representations: to define the conditions in which
human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the world in
which they live.
(Foucault, Uses of Pleasure)

While the foregoing discussion has provided us with a Foucauldian analysis of biopower,
now we have to consider the significance of such analysis. If networks of power are all
around us, then what is the point of such analysis since it seems we cannot escape power?
Before I can answer these questions, we might take a look at criticisms of Foucault’s
analysis that bring up similar questions.
One of the most common charges against Foucault is that he does not provide a
normative theory in place of all that he critiques. Jurgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser
criticize Foucault along these lines. For Fraser, Foucault’s work raises questions that it is
“structurally unequipped to answer” (Fraser 1989: 27) and I will address this charge
below. Habermas finds Foucault to be contradictory, ambiguous, universalizing, and most
of all, conflating the two notions of knowledge and power by the use of the term powerknowledge. Habermas states,
There is some unclarity, to begin with, regarding the problem of how discourses –
scientific and non-scientific – are related to practices: whether one governs the other,
whether their relationship is to be conceived as that of base to superstructure, or on
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the model of a circular causality, or as an interplay of structure and event. (Habermas
1990: 243).
Thus Habermas attempts to attribute causality to Foucault’s analysis. As Jason Cato
(2002) points out, this “false” attribution of causality is due to a “misreading and
misunderstanding of some of Foucault’s most important insights and qualifications
regarding power” (1). Cato clarifies that “Foucault does not want to implement power as
an historical deus ex machina, nor does he intend his conception of power to extend
beyond a particular domain” (3).
It is true that Foucault does not offer a “theory” of power, as he himself admits.
However, in keeping with his genealogical project, Foucault is not interested in critiquing
any particular model of power only to immediately replace it with his own model. Had he
done so, he would have been contradicting his own critical undertaking. Thus to say that
Foucault does not provide an alternative model or normative account cannot be a
pertinent criticism of Foucault. As Paul Bové (2000: ix) points out,
thinkers such as Habermas and Nancy Fraser [try] to oblige Foucault to answer
questions about issues raised within the very systems of discourse that… come from
the very “mind-set” [Foucault] was trying to critique.
While we can thus contest the criticism put forward by Habermas and Fraser, there does
appear in Foucault’s analysis a sense of all encompassing power, from which there seems
to be no escape. And in addition to this, if individuals are nothing but subjects of power,
then the notion of “woman” itself becomes problematic, as does the possibility of
resistance. As Margaret McLaren (2004: 214) points out, for certain feminists there is
thus no basis “for an emancipatory or libratory politics” in Foucault’s work.
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To address this issue adequately, we have to note what Foucault himself says
about the possibility of resistance and freedom. As we have already seen, power is not a
thing but relations, and thus there are only “local and unstable” effects of power (HS: 93).
The force relations that “engender states of power” (HS: 93) also can give rise to points
of resistance.
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power…the strictly
relational character of power relationships. . . . depends on a multiplicity of points of
resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power
relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.
(HS: 95)
Power is thus not a totalizing or universalizing force. Though one cannot stand outside
the network of power, there is the possibility of a “local critique” (Cato 2002: 11).
And most importantly, as “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a
substantial part of itself” (HS: 86), unmasking the workings of power-knowledge leads to
the possibilities of desubjectification, of a resistance to power. If the mechanisms of
power are made visible, power loses much of its hold on us. There occurs a
demystification. And within the network of power relations Foucault identifies a “field of
possibilities” that are available to us. For Foucault, power is
exercised only over free subjects… subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities
in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may
be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship
of power. … consequently there is no face to face confrontation of power and
freedom… [but] freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power.
(SP: 221)
Thus at the very core of power relations “are the recalcitrance of the will and the
intransigence of freedom” (SP: 221-2), opening up for us avenues of resistance.
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However, we must note that this resistance is not the kind of revolutionary struggle that
Marx imagines. For Foucault, there is no “locus of great Refusal” but only the “plurality
of resistances, each of them a special case” (HS: 96). They can be possible or improbable,
necessary or spontaneous or even those resistances that are “quick to compromise” (HS:
96). Neither is resistance passive or reactionary.
As a feminist, McLaren finds Foucault’s genealogical work a valuable resource
for feminist politics (2004: 215). She reads resistance as a “form of situated social
criticism” (218) and interprets freedom as the constitution of new forms of subjectivity.
Understanding the processes of subjectification as the operations of institutions and
practices makes possible the constitutions of different subjectivities. Further, Dreyfus and
Rabinow highlight the liberatory aspect in Foucault’s work on biopower most clearly.
According to them,
when [Foucault] shows that the practices of our culture have produced both
objectification and subjectification, he has already loosened the grip, the seeming
naturalness and necessity these practices have. The force of bio-power lies in defining
reality as well as producing it… Through interpretive analytics, Foucault has been
able to reveal the concrete, material mechanisms which have been producing this
reality, while he describes with minute detail the transparent masks behind which
these mechanisms are hidden. (1982: 203, emphasis mine)
In other words, all that we usually take as normal or necessary can be seen through the
Foucauldian lens as accidental play of forces, thus releasing the hold they have on us as
reified or totalizing forces.
In the sovereign or the related juridical model of power, the possibility of
resistance is minimized from the beginning. One either “has” power or does not. One is
either the oppressor or the oppressed. In contrast to this, a Foucauldian understanding of
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power already loosens these binary relations. Within the capillary networks of power, one
can simultaneously undergo and exercise resistance as well as power. As Foucault says,
“as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation
becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible” (1988: 155).
Through the Foucauldian interpretation of the case of Melissa Ann Rowland, I
attempted to unmask the not-so-visible techniques of biopolitics that produce the
pregnant woman as a subject of power. The unmasking makes it possible to think
differently which is a primary task of philosophy. Specifically, such a critique helps in
reformulating the problem as one of subjectivation. Secondly, my analysis provides a
way of thinking about such problems without referring to the problematic notion of
rights: one, this makes it possible to avoid the quagmire of fetal versus maternal rights;
and two, it also avoids the problem of individual rights that derive their meaning from the
sovereignty of the state (SMD: 37), which in turn assumes the existence of autonomous
individuals.
As we have seen, new biopolitical techniques have arisen during the last two
centuries whose operations are very different from the sovereign exercise of absolute
power. Thus a biopolitical framework is most fruitful for analyzing current social issues,
especially in understanding pregnancy because it is so immediately tied to the production
of life – the central issue of biopolitics. The medicalization of childbirth is also a part of
the biopolitical exercise of power. A biopolitical analysis thus explains the intense focus
on life processes and the heightened concern for fetal welfare. Finally, my work fills the
gap in existing literature by explicitly addressing the issue of power-knowledge in
understanding pregnancy, and by explaining the conjunction of legal and medical
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discourses that regulate it. It opens up the possibility of a feminist reappropriation of the
subject as a “function ceaselessly modified” (FL 67) within the biopolitical play of
forces, once the lines of biopower are unmasked.
I have explicated the Foucauldian biopolitical framework at length; however, my
discussion does not include the philosophical ideas that preceded biopolitics. For
example, Sinnerbrink (2005) finds an anticipation of the notion of biopolitics in
Heidegger’s notion of Machenschaft or machination which reflects the theme of a
“convergence between biological existence, technology, and sociopolitical power
relations” (240). On the other hand, Vilarós (2005) interprets the notions of nomos,
nahme and name in Schmitt’s work as a precursor to Foucauldian biopolitics. Further,
there are other theorists such as Giorgio Agamben (1998), and Negri and Hardt (2003)
who use the term biopolitics in their works, but as scholars (Rabinow and Rose 2006;
Sinnerbrink 2005) have pointed out, these theorists’ conceptions of the term are not
exactly analogous to Foucault’s own.
The current social reality seems to be saturated with debates around abortion,
interpretation of fetal “life,” and the definition of the limits of life. Biopolitical frames of
research are increasingly relevant under these circumstances. A critical feminist analysis
of these issues can benefit from a Foucauldian approach as I have laid out in my thesis.
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